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I. INTRODUCTION
In November of 1938, Helen Hulick arrived in a Los Angeles court
to testify against two burglary suspects.1 However, Judge Arthur S.
Guerin sent Hulick home, ordering her to return in a dress, rather
than the pants she was wearing. He warned that if she “insist[ed] on
wearing slacks again [she] w[ould] be prevented from testifying be-
cause that would hinder the administration of justice.”2 When Hulick
returned the next day, again wearing pants, Judge Guerin held her in
contempt of court and sentenced her to five days in jail. Though Hu-
lick’s contempt citation was eventually overturned by the appellate di-
vision, freeing Hulick to wear pants to court,3 the episode illustrated
commonly held views about women’s apparel and place in society.4
Up until the 1970s, courts assumed women’s proper roles were do-
mestic and maternal, and “regularly uph[eld] sex-based distinctions
under the logic of protecting women’s domesticity, maternal bodies,
and sexual morals.”5 Supreme Court Justice Bradley once expressed
that “[t]he constitution of the family organization, which is founded in
the divine ordinance, as well as in the nature of things, indicates the
domestic sphere as that which properly belongs to the domain and
functions of womanhood.”6
Congress challenged these assumptions when it passed Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Though the Act was initially intended to
combat discrimination in employment on the basis of race, Congress
made the “last-minute addition of ‘sex’ to the forbidden grounds of
race, color, national origin, and religion.”7 The passage of Title VII
opened the floodgates to sex discrimination litigation, and whole cate-
gories of work that had only been available for one gender now
presented opportunities for both men and women.8 “Extreme acts of
employment discrimination have diminished” since the passage of Ti-
tle VII; however, more subtle forms of prejudice remain, including dif-
1. Scott Harrison, California Retrospective: In 1938, L.A. Woman Went to Jail for




4. See Noa Ben-Asher, The Two Laws of Sex Stereotyping, 57 B.C. L. REV. 1187,
1198 (2016).
5. Id. (citations omitted).
6. Bradwell v. State, 83 U.S. 130, 141 (1872) (Bradley, J., concurring).
7. Mary Anne Case, Legal Protections for the “Personal Best” of Each Employee: Ti-
tle VII’s Prohibition on Sex Discrimination, the Legacy of Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins, and the Prospect of ENDA, 66 STAN. L. REV. 1333, 1338 (2014).
8. Id.
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ferent dress and grooming requirements for men and women in the
workplace.9
This Comment explains how employer-mandated sex-differenti-
ated dress and grooming codes have become the “Title VII blind
spot”10 and argues that this could be remedied in the Eighth Circuit
by extending the Supreme Court’s sex stereotyping doctrine as applied
in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins.11
II. THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM AND EMPLOYER-
MANDATED SEX-DIFFERENTIATED DRESS AND
GROOMING CODES UNDER TITLE VII
Though the Supreme Court has not specifically addressed Title
VII’s application to employee dress and grooming policies,12 it has dis-
cussed the Congressional intent behind Title VII and analyzed the
text of Title VII as a whole. Under Title VII, it is unlawful for an em-
ployer “to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or other-
wise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,” or “to
limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employ-
ment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individ-
9. Mark R. Bandsuch, Dressing Up Title VII’s Analysis of Workplace Appearance
Policies, 40 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 287, 287 (2009).
10. Jennifer L. Levi, Misapplying Equality Theories: Dress Codes at Work, 19 YALE
J.L. & FEMINISM 353, 356 (2008).
11. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989). Notably, the Civil Rights Act
of 1991 overturned Price Waterhouse’s treatment of mixed motive claims, specifi-
cally related to burdens of persuasion and causation showings. However, it did
not overturn the underlying rationale of sex stereotyping that is relevant to this
Comment. See Burrage v. United States, 571 U.S. 204, 213 n.4 (2014) (noting that
the Civil Rights Act of 1991 dispensed with Price Waterhouse’s treatment of but-
for causation); Lewis v. Heartland Inns of Am., L.L.C., 591 F.3d 1033, 1038 (8th
Cir. 2010) (“The Price Waterhouse plurality’s understanding that an employer
might escape liability by showing that it would have made the same decision even
without a discriminatory motive is no longer permissible because Congress pro-
vided otherwise, . . . but the Court’s conclusion that Title VII prohibits sex stere-
otyping endures.”).
12. Elizabeth Malcom, Comment, “Looking and Feeling Your Best”: A Comprehensive
Approach to Groom and Dress Policies Under Title VII, 46 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 505,
514 (2009). Notably, in the Supreme Court’s recent decision, Bostock v. Clayton
County, the Court held that “an employer who fires someone simply for being
homosexual or transgender has discharged or otherwise discriminated against
that individual ‘because of such individual’s sex’” in violation of Title VII. 140 S.
Ct. 1731, 1753 (2020). In his majority opinion, Justice Gorsuch specified that the
legality of “sex-segregated” dress codes was not before the Court in that case. Id.
This Comment does not otherwise address the arguments posed by the majority
in Bostock.
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ual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his
status as an employee, because of such individual’s . . . sex.”13
Courts and commentators have frequently contended that “there is
no useful legislative history attached to the introduction of sex as a
forbidden ground in Title VII”14 because the amendment was intro-
duced merely “one day before the House of Representatives approved
Title VII.”15 Some commentators assert that Representative Howard
Smith of Virginia, a noted racist, proposed this amendment both as a
joke and as an attempt to defeat the Civil Rights Act.16 Although
“Representative Smith was indeed a racist and would have been
happy to see the defeat of the Civil Rights Act, . . . he had also been a
sponsor of the Equal Rights Amendment since 1943 and was a sup-
porter of the National Women’s Party (NWP).”17 Categorizing the
amendment as a joke also ignores the remarks of numerous represent-
atives who advocated for the amendment on the floor of the House18
and the fact that both houses of Congress approved the amendment
and passed the Civil Rights Act without further changes to the sex
discrimination provision.19
The Supreme Court affirmed that Congress, through Title VII,
made classifications based on sex unlawful.20 The Court declared: “In
forbidding employers to discriminate against individuals because of
their sex, Congress intended to strike at the entire spectrum of dispa-
13. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)–(2) (2018). Title VII does permit employers to discrimi-
nate on the basis of sex when sex is a bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ)
“reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or en-
terprise.” § 2000e-2(e)(1). “The BFOQ defense is written narrowly,” and the Su-
preme Court has indicated that it only reaches “special situations.” Int’l Union v.
Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 201 (1991). Besides noting that BFOQ can
be a potential affirmative defense for an employer implementing a sex-differenti-
ated dress code, this Comment will not engage in a comprehensive analysis of the
BFOQ.
14. Case, supra note 7, at 1339.
15. Willingham v. Macon Tel. Publ’g Co., 507 F.2d 1084, 1090 (5th Cir. 1975); accord.
Malcom, supra note 12, at 512.
16. Case, supra note 7, at 1339.
17. Id.
18. See, e.g., 110 CONG. REC. 2580 (1964) (statement of Rep. Martha Griffiths) (“[A]
vote against this amendment today by a white man is a vote against his wife, or
his widow, or his daughter, or his sister.”); id. at 2583 (statement of Rep. Edna
Kelly) (“My support and sponsorship of this amendment and of this bill is an
endeavor to have all persons, men and women, possess the same rights and same
opportunities.”); id. at 2581 (statement of Rep. Katharine St. George) (“The addi-
tion of that little, terrifying word ‘s-e-x’ will not hurt this legislation in any way.
In fact, it will improve it. It will make it comprehensive. It will make it logical. It
will make it right.”).
19. Malcom, supra note 12, at 512–13.
20. City of L.A. Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 709 (1978).
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rate treatment of men and women resulting from sex stereotypes.”21
In an often-cited concurrence, Justice Marshall observed that “charac-
terizations of the proper domestic roles of the sexes [a]re not to serve
as predicates for restricting employment opportunity.”22 Accordingly,
employers are not only prohibited from restricting employment oppor-
tunities on the basis of sex, but also from grounding employment deci-
sions “on mere ‘stereotyped’ impressions about the characteristics of
males or females.”23
Although society has made progress in workplace gender equality
and the Supreme Court has broadly criticized employment classifica-
tions based on sex or stereotyped impressions of men and women,
lower courts have uniformly ruled that employer-mandated sex-differ-
entiated dress and grooming codes comply with Title VII.24 This was
not always the case. In the period immediately following the passage
of Title VII, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)
was prepared to pursue cases where an employer imposed different
grooming standards on men and women. In 1972 the EEOC ruled:
To maintain one employment standard for females and another for males dis-
criminates because of sex . . . and is unlawful unless the employer demon-
strates the applicability of the narrow bona fide occupational qualification
exception . . . [which w]e hold, that as a matter of law, . . . is not applicable to
[the] Employer’s long hair policy.25
21. Id. at 707 n.13 (quoting Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1198
(7th Cir. 1971)).
22. Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 545 (1971) (Marshall, J.,
concurring).
23. Manhart, 435 U.S. at 707.
24. See, e.g., Tavora v. N.Y. Mercantile Exch., 101 F.3d 907, 908 (2d Cir. 1996) (up-
holding employer grooming policy “limiting hair length for male employees but
imposing no similar restriction on female employees”); Earwood v. Cont’l Se.
Lines, Inc., 539 F.2d 1349, 1350 (4th Cir. 1976) (holding that sex-differentiated
grooming standards alone do not constitute discrimination under Title VII); Wil-
lingham v. Macon Tel. Publ’g Co., 507 F.2d 1084, 1088 (5th Cir. 1975) (upholding
a grooming policy that prohibited men, but not women, from having long hair);
Barker v. Taft Broad. Co., 549 F.2d 400, 401 (6th Cir. 1977) (upholding an em-
ployer’s grooming code that included hair length restrictions for men but not wo-
men); Knott v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 527 F.2d 1249, 1249 (8th Cir. 1975) (upholding
“private employer’s grooming code imposing limits on the hair length of male em-
ployees while at the same time not imposing similar limits on the hair length of
female employees”); Fountain v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 555 F.2d 753, 755 (9th Cir.
1977) (upholding employer’s dress code requiring men, but not women, to wear
neckties); Harper v. Blockbuster Entm’t Corp., 139 F.3d 1385, 1387 (11th Cir.
1998) (holding that an employer’s “differing hair length standards for men and
women do not violate Title VII”); Dodge v. Giant Food, Inc., 488 F.2d 1333, 1337
(D.C. Cir. 1973) (holding Title VII did not invalidate employer’s grooming stan-
dards requiring men, but not women, to have short hair).
25. EEOC Decision No. 72-1380, 4 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 846 (1972).
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This view was supported and afforded deference by several early dis-
trict court rulings.26 In Donohue v. Shoe Corp. of America, Judge
Pregerson eloquently reasoned:
In our society we too often form opinions of people on the basis of skin color,
religion, national origin, style of dress, hair length, and other superficial fea-
tures. That tendency to stereotype people is at the root of some of the social
ills that afflict the country, and in adopting the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Con-
gress intended to attack these stereotyped characterizations so that people
would be judged by their intrinsic worth.27
Similarly, in his opinion for Aros v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., Judge
Ferguson maintained that “[a]n employer has every right to adopt
dress codes suitable to various job categories. . . . A dress and groom-
ing code, however, must be applied equally to everyone. It may not
establish different standards for males and females; it may not dis-
criminate on the basis of sex.”28 Judge Ferguson went on to assert
that Title VII does not allow employers to “indulge” in generalizations
or stereotyped responses and “requires that every individual be judged
according to his own conduct and job performance.”29
Over time, however, courts moved away from this view and began
endorsing employer-mandated sex-differentiated dress and grooming
codes.30 Eventually, “[e]ven the EEOC admitted defeat.”31 It an-
nounced that it would continue to hold “to its longstanding view that
absent a showing of a business necessity, different grooming stan-
dards for men and women constitute sex discrimination under Title
VII.”32 However, it would close all sex discrimination charges that
dealt with male hair length because “the circuit courts of appeals
ha[d] unanimously concluded that different appearance standards for
male and female employees, particularly those involving hair length
where women are allowed to wear long hair but men are not, do not
constitute sex discrimination.”33 By 1981, the EEOC Compliance
Manual’s examples of Title VII compliant dress codes included an em-
ployer “requir[ing] male employees to wear neckties at all times and
female employees to wear skirts or dresses at all times” so long as the
26. E.g., Donohue v. Shoe Corp. of Am., 337 F. Supp. 1357, 1359 (C.D. Cal. 1972)
(finding a prima facie violation of Title VII where an employer permitted women
to wear long hair, but not men); Aros v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 348 F. Supp.
661, 664 (C.D. Cal. 1972) (“The [EEOC] has determined that an individual’s hair
length and other personal appearance standards are terms and conditions of em-
ployment within the meaning of [Title VII]. This court agrees.” (citation
omitted)).
27. Donohue, 337 F. Supp. at 1359.
28. Aros, 348 F. Supp. at 666.
29. Id. (“Males with long hair conjure up exactly the sort of stereotyped responses
Congress intended to be discarded.”).
30. See generally supra note 24.
31. Case, supra note 7, at 1355.
32. Id. (quoting 2 EEOC Compl. Man. (CCH) § 619.1 (Oct. 1981)).
33. Id.
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dress code imposed equivalent standards or burdens on men and
women.34
Courts have used several rationales to justify upholding sex-differ-
entiated dress and grooming codes. Some found that Title VII did not
cover personal appearance codes because the characteristics were
neither immutable nor constitutionally protected activities such as
marriage or child rearing.35 Other courts posited that “grooming re-
quirements do not amount to Title VII violations where there is only a
negligible effect on employment opportunities.”36 Still other courts
reasoned “that policing grooming codes would be an unwarranted judi-
cial intrusion into an employer’s business decisions.”37 Whatever ra-
tionale a court used, employees bringing Title VII claims regarding a
sex-differentiated dress code almost always lost, remaining in a “Title
VII blind spot” while facially sex-based practices and policies in other
areas were struck down.38
III. SEX STEREOTYPING AND PRICE WATERHOUSE
A. The Supreme Court’s Adoption of Sex Stereotyping
Analysis
In 1989 the Supreme Court decided Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,39
a case which some have called “the most important development in sex
discrimination jurisprudence since the passage of Title VII”40 and
which many believed would eliminate the Title VII blind spot.41
34. Id. (quoting 2 EEOC Compl. Man. (CCH) § 619.4(d) (Oct. 1981)) (alteration in
original).
35. E.g., Earwood v. Cont’l Se. Lines, Inc., 539 F.2d 1349, 1351 (4th Cir. 1976) (rea-
soning that employer’s hair length policy does not violate Title VII because hair
length is not an immutable characteristic and does not affect a fundamental
right); Willingham v. Macon Tel. Publ’g Co., 507 F.2d 1084, 1091 (5th Cir. 1975)
(“Hair length is not immutable and in the situation of employer vis à vis em-
ployee enjoys no constitutional protection.”); Dodge v. Giant Food, Inc., 488 F.2d
1333, 1336 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (“[H]air length is not an immutable characteristic but
one which is easily altered.”). But see Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S.
542 (1971) (holding employer’s policy allowing male employees, but not female
employees, to have pre-school-age children violated Title VII); Sprogis v. United
Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1197 (7th Cir. 1971) (holding employer’s policy
requiring female employees, but not male employees, to be unmarried violated
Title VII).
36. EEOC v. Sage Realty Corp., 507 F. Supp. 599, 609 n.15 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (first
citing Barker v. Taft Broad. Co., 549 F.2d 400, 401 (6th Cir. 1977); then citing
Knott v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 527 F.2d 1249 (8th Cir. 1975) as examples).
37. Case, supra note 7, at 1356.
38. Levi, supra note 10, at 355–56.
39. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989), superseded by statute, Civil
Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071.
40. Kimberly A. Yuracko, Soul of a Woman: The Sex Stereotyping Prohibition at
Work, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 757, 758 (2013).
41. See, e.g., Levi, supra note 10, at 372.
776 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 99:769
Ann Hopkins had worked at Price Waterhouse, a nationwide pro-
fessional accounting partnership in Washington D.C., for five years
when the partners nominated her as a candidate for partnership.42
Partners at Hopkins’s office praised her as “an outstanding profes-
sional” with a “deft touch,” and “strong character, independence and
integrity.”43 Additionally, Hopkins “played a key role” in securing a
multi-million dollar contract between Price Waterhouse and the De-
partment of State.44 Still, partners opposing her candidacy described
Hopkins as “macho,” suggested she “overcompensated for being a wo-
man,” and “advised her to take ‘a course at charm school.’ ”45 When
Price Waterhouse ultimately informed Hopkins that her candidacy
had been placed on hold, the partners explained that she would have a
better chance at becoming partner if she “walk[ed] more femininely,
talk[ed] more femininely, dress[ed] more femininely, w[ore] make-up,
ha[d] her hair styled, and w[ore] jewelry.”46 When the partners in her
office refused to re-propose her for partnership, Hopkins sued Price
Waterhouse alleging sex discrimination under Title VII.47
In a 6–3 decision, the Court held that sex stereotyping had imper-
missibly played a part in Price Waterhouse’s decision to not make
Hopkins a partner.48 The Court laid the foundation for its decision by
reiterating that “[i]n passing Title VII, Congress made the simple but
momentous announcement that sex, race, religion, and national origin
are not relevant to the selection, evaluation, or compensation of em-
ployees.”49 The Court declared that “Congress’ [sic] intent to forbid
employers to take gender into account in making employment deci-
sions appears on the face of the statute”50 and took those words of
Title VII “to mean that gender must be irrelevant to employment deci-
sions.”51 The Court further cited an interpretive memorandum en-
tered into the Congressional Record by the comanagers of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 in the Senate.52 The memorandum asserted that
“[t]o discriminate is to make a distinction, to make a difference in
42. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 233.
43. Id. at 234.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 235.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 231–32.
48. Id. at 257–58. Though the language quoted in this Comment comes from the plu-
rality opinion, the disagreement of the concurring Justices was with the burden
of proof, rather than with the sex stereotyping theory of liability or the sufficiency
of the evidence. See id. at 260–61 (White, J., concurring); id. at 261–62 (O’Connor,
J., concurring).
49. Id. at 239 (plurality opinion).
50. Id.
51. Id. at 240.
52. Id. at 243–44.
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treatment or favor,”53 and that Title VII prohibits distinctions or dif-
ferences in treatment or favor on the basis of sex.54
In applying Title VII to Hopkins’s case, the Court confirmed that
Price Waterhouse had engaged in sex stereotyping because “an em-
ployer who acts on the basis of a belief that a woman cannot be aggres-
sive, or that she must not be, has acted on the basis of gender.”55 The
Court reasoned that “[a]n employer who objects to aggressiveness in
women but whose positions require this trait places women in an in-
tolerable and impermissible catch 22: out of a job if they behave ag-
gressively and out of a job if they do not. Title VII lifts women out of
this bind.”56 Consequently, the Court effectively stated that “a woman
who proffered evidence that she received an adverse employment deci-
sion due to a failure to conform to expectations of gendered expression
in the workplace had stated a claim of sex discrimination.”57 The
Court further declared:
[W]e are beyond the day when an employer could evaluate employees by as-
suming or insisting that they matched the stereotype associated with their
group, for “[i]n forbidding employers to discriminate against individuals be-
cause of their sex, Congress intended to strike at the entire spectrum of dispa-
rate treatment of men and women resulting from sex stereotypes.”58
B. Price Waterhouse’s Anticipated Effect on Employer-
Mandated Sex-Differentiated Dress and Grooming
Codes
The Court’s prohibition on sex stereotyping is significant because it
actually encompassed two different forms of sex stereotyping: “ascrip-
tive stereotyping and prescriptive stereotyping.”59 Employers engage
in ascriptive stereotyping, the more traditional form of sex stereotyp-
ing, when they assume employees possess particular characteristics
because of their sex that make them unqualified for a job.60 Price
Waterhouse, on the other hand, involved prescriptive stereotyping,
53. Id. at 244 (quoting 110 CONG. REC. 7213 (1964)).
54. Id. (citing 110 CONG. REC. 7213 (1964)).
55. Id. at 250.
56. Id. at 251.
57. Levi, supra note 10, at 377 (citing Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 250).
58. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 251 (second alteration in original) (quoting City of
L.A. Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 n.13 (1978)).
59. Yuracko, supra note 40, at 763.
60. Id.; see also, e.g., Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 544 (1971)
(holding an employer could not refuse to hire women with young children based
on the assumption that women would have heavier childcare responsibilities
than men with young children); Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194,
1198–99 (7th Cir. 1971) (striking down an employer’s no-marriage rule that only
applied to female flight personnel, reasoning it was based on sex stereotypes
about women’s domestic role).
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which occurs when employers insist that employees display certain
characteristics because of their sex.61
The Court’s novel and broad declaration against prescriptive stere-
otyping excited proponents of eliminating the Title VII blind spot. The
Court had previously disparaged classifications based on sex and pro-
hibited employers from grounding employment decisions on “ ‘stereo-
typed’ impressions about the characteristics of males or females.”62
However, those cases dealt with ascriptive stereotyping.63 In Price
Waterhouse, the Court condemned Price Waterhouse’s prescriptive re-
quirement that Hopkins display feminine characteristics—recogniz-
ing gender discrimination in the company’s stereotypical notions of
the way Hopkins, as a woman, should dress and present herself—and
declared that “gender must be irrelevant to employment decisions.”64
After Price Waterhouse, the designation of a plaintiff’s sex would,
in theory, serve only as the grounding for a claim against an em-
ployer.65 Fundamentally, a plaintiff could now argue: “If my sex were
other than the one you have attributed to me, I would not be in the
position I’m in. You wouldn’t be refusing to hire me or promote me;
you wouldn’t be harassing me; you wouldn’t be requiring me to dress
this way.”66
Like Price Waterhouse’s stereotypical expectations of Hopkins,
sex-differentiated dress and grooming codes “classify employees by sex
and treat them differently based solely on that classification.”67 In
this way, sex-differentiated dress and grooming codes allow outmoded
sex stereotypes to be tolerated and encouraged in the workplace.68
One legal commentator provides an analogy to illustrate how such
policies allow sex stereotyping in the workplace: Suppose Employer A
allows its employees to dress however they want for work so long as
they wear a sticker indicating whether they are male or female.69
Now, suppose Employer B strictly dictates its employees’ “clothing
and manner of grooming (including hair length and nail style) accord-
ing to [each] employee’s sex.” This could include requiring women to
wear only skirts and apply makeup, while requiring men to wear
dress pants and have short hair.70
61. Yuracko, supra note 40, at 763.
62. Manhart, 435 U.S. at 707.
63. See Zachary R. Herz, Note, Price’s Progress: Sex Stereotyping and Its Potential for
Antidiscrimination Law, 124 YALE L.J. 396, 404–06 (2014).
64. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 240 (1989), superseded by statute,
Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071.
65. Case, supra note 7, at 1344.
66. Id. (emphasis added).
67. Levi, supra note 10, at 360.
68. Id. at 372.
69. Id. at 370.
70. Id.
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The effect of each policy is “conveying to others the sex of the indi-
vidual employee.” Both require “a determination of an employee’s sex
and some outward expression or statement of it.”71 However, Em-
ployer A only requires a public indication of the employee’s sex with-
out imposing a “gender norm.” If employees do express a gender norm,
they do so by choice.72 Employer B, on the other hand, requires em-
ployees to both publicly identify their sex and “incorporate a particu-
lar norm of gender expression.”73 If the employers’ policies are
compared quantitatively, Employer B’s dress code requirements could
be described as more imposing than Employer A’s sticker require-
ment. Stated as an equation, one could say Employer B’s dress code =
Employer A’s sex sticker + the gendered norm defined by Employer
B.74 Thus, using “basic modern mathematical principles,” if Employer
A’s sex sticker is prohibited,75 Employer B’s dress code should be as
well, “unless the addition of a gendered norm is what makes the dress
code permissible.”76
As observed by numerous scholars, employer-mandated sex-differ-
entiated dress and grooming codes “allow employers to make sex a rel-
evant characteristic in the workplace.”77 They allow employers to
impose policies that harm people whose gender identity lies outside of
cultural norms.78 They ignore the fact that “[d]ress codes can cause
various injuries, including cultural profiling, subordination, assimila-
tion, marginalization, stereotype threat, covering, compromising of
group and individual identity, limits to freedom of expression and
overall autonomy, loss of personal dignity, prejudice, bias, lower inno-
vation, less authenticity, reduced trust, stress, dissatisfaction, disre-
spect, inequality, and lost energy.”79
Most importantly, employer-mandated sex-differentiated dress
and grooming codes “undermine Title VII equality commitments by
saying that sex is a meaningful, even an important, characteristic in
the workplace.”80 This is in direct contradiction to the Supreme





75. The sex sticker hypothetical is likely impermissible. See Anderson v. Martin, 375
U.S. 399, 403–04 (1964) (striking down a Louisiana statute requiring that ballots
have the race of each candidate for elective office in parentheses next to his or her
name); see also Levi, supra note 10, at 371–72 (discussing Anderson’s implica-
tions for employer-mandated sex-differentiated dress and grooming codes).
76. Levi, supra note 10, at 370.
77. Id. at 372.
78. Id. at 364.
79. Bandsuch, supra note 9, at 312.
80. Levi, supra note 10, at 372.
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cisions.”81 When the Price Court affirmed Congress’s intent—that
treating employees differently based on sex would be considered dis-
crimination82—it seemed to embraced a “foundational” principle of
discrimination law: “[H]arm is inherent in different treatment.”83
Such harm is created by sex-differentiated dress and grooming codes.
Sex-differentiated dress and grooming codes not only rouse sex-
based prejudice in the workplace but tolerate and encourage it.84 The
use of immutable characteristics to categorize people often invigorates
private prejudice against groups that lack “majoritarian support in
the public square.”85 This is exacerbated by the fact that these codes
often “reflect a white male bias in the workplace,” which “perpetu-
ate[s] assimilation, subordination, and stigmatization.”86 These detri-
mental effects contribute to the social and economic inequality that
Title VII was crafted to remedy.87
If employers can no longer evaluate employees by insisting they
match the stereotypes associated with their sex,88 and “gender must
be irrelevant to employment decisions,”89 then an employer-mandated
sex-differentiated dress code would violate Title VII unless it could be
justified as a BFOQ.
C. Price Waterhouse’s (Lack of) Effect on Employer-
Mandated Sex-Differentiated Dress and Grooming
Codes
While commentators posited that Price Waterhouse would remove
the Title VII blind spot and assure legal protection for women who
were viewed as more “masculine,” this has not been the case.90 Courts
relying on Price Waterhouse have become receptive to claims by gay
and effeminate men, and Price Waterhouse “has been the catalyst for a
sea [of] change in courts’ treatment of transsexuals.”91 However,
courts are still hostile towards plaintiffs like Hopkins—“women who
asserted no identity as a sexual minority, but whose gender presenta-
81. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 240 (1989), superseded by statute,
Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071.
82. Id. at 243–44 (citing 110 CONG. REC. 7213 (1964)).
83. Levi, supra note 10, at 369.
84. Id. at 372.
85. Id. at 369 n.81.
86. Bandsuch, supra note 9, at 296.
87. Id.
88. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989), superseded by statute,
Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071.
89. Id. at 240.
90. See Case, supra note 7, at 1335–36.
91. Yuracko, supra note 40, at 758.
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tion veered slightly more in a masculine direction than suited their
employers.”92
Furthermore, the few courts that have revisited employer-man-
dated sex-differentiated dress and grooming codes since Price
Waterhouse have continued to uphold them. In 1998, the Eleventh Cir-
cuit upheld an employer’s policy requiring only male employees to
have short hair. The court maintained that the plaintiffs did not cite a
decision that “supplanted the reasoning or called into question” the
long-standing, binding precedent upholding such policies.93 Bewilder-
ingly, the opinion does not even mention Price Waterhouse, leaving
one to wonder whether there had been a severe oversight by either the
plaintiffs’ lawyer or the court.94 Other courts have similarly upheld
sex-differentiated dress and grooming codes.95
Even in an opinion declaring that “the holding in Price Waterhouse
applies with equal force to a man who is discriminated against for act-
ing too feminine,”96 the Ninth Circuit went out of its way to include a
footnote specifically upholding employer-mandated sex-differentiated
dress and grooming codes. The court stated: “We do not imply that all
gender-based distinctions are actionable under Title VII. For example,
our decision does not imply that there is any violation of Title VII oc-
casioned by reasonable regulations that require male and female em-
ployees to conform to different dress and grooming standards.”97 The
assertion in this dicta was further developed in the controversial case
Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co.98
92. Case, supra note 7, at 1352.
93. Harper v. Blockbuster Entm’t Corp., 139 F.3d 1385, 1389 (11th Cir. 1998); see
also Tavora v. N.Y. Mercantile Exch., 101 F.3d 907, 908 (2d Cir. 1996) (per
curiam) (holding, without mention of Price Waterhouse, that recent Supreme
Court cases had not undercut prior lower court precedents upholding differing
employer-mandated hair length requirements for men and women).
94. Case, supra note 7, at 1356–57 (“Astonishingly, there is no mention whatsoever of
[Price Waterhouse] in the court’s opinion, leaving the reader to wonder whether
the plaintiffs’ lawyer had committed malpractice or whether the court was being
disingenuous in distinguishing only a series of cases much less obviously
relevant.”).
95. See, e.g., Tavora, 101 F.3d at 908 (holding, without mention of Price Waterhouse,
that recent Supreme Court cases had not undercut previous precedent upholding
employers’ gender-differentiated hair length requirements); Kleinsorge v. Eye-
land Corp., No. CIV. A. 99-5025, 2000 WL 124559, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 31, 2000)
(finding that a grooming code allowing women, but not men, to wear earrings did
not violate Title VII); Pecenka v. Fareway Stores, Inc., 672 N.W.2d 800, 804 (Iowa
2003) (“[P]ersonal grooming codes that reflect customary modes of grooming hav-
ing only an insignificant impact on employment opportunities do not constitute
sex discrimination within the meaning of [Title VII].”).
96. Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., 256 F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001).
97. Id. at 875 n.7.
98. 444 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc).
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Darlene Jespersen worked successfully as a bartender at the sports
bar in Harrah’s Reno casino for twenty years, compiling an exemplary
record.99 After her two decades with the company, Harrah’s imple-
mented a “Beverage Department Image Transformation” program at
numerous locations, including its Reno casino.100 The program in-
cluded a new dress and grooming code which was known as the “Per-
sonal Best” program.101 The program required both male and female
beverage servers to wear “a standard uniform of black pants, white
shirt, black vest, and black bow tie.”102 However, the program also
included the following sex-differentiated requirements for workers’
hair, nails, and makeup:
Males:
Hair must not extend below top of shirt collar. Ponytails are prohibited.
Hands and fingernails must be clean and nails neatly trimmed at all times.
No colored polish is permitted.
Eye and facial makeup is not permitted.
. . . .
Females:
Hair must be teased, curled, or styled every day you work. Hair must be
worn down at all times, no exceptions.
Stockings are to be of nude or natural color consistent with employee’s skin
tone. No runs.
Nail polish can be clear, white, pink or red color only. No exotic nail art or
length.
. . . .
Make up (face powder, blush and mascara) must be worn and applied
neatly in complimentary colors. Lip color must be worn at all times.103
Women in the beverage department, including Jespersen, had compul-
sory meetings with professional image consultants who created “a fa-
cial template for each woman” and determined exactly how she should
apply her makeup.104
Though the policy differentiated on the basis of sex in several re-
spects, Jespersen specifically objected to the makeup requirement, al-
leging that she found it offensive and “felt so uncomfortable wearing
makeup that she found it interfered with her ability to perform as a
bartender.”105 Harrah’s fired Jespersen for her refusal to wear
makeup.106
The Ninth Circuit heard the case en banc “in order to reaffirm [its]
circuit law concerning appearance and grooming standards, and to
99. Id. at 1105–07.




104. Id. at 1114 (Pregerson, J., dissenting).
105. Id. at 1108 (majority opinion).
106. Id. at 1106.
2021] WHO WEARS THE PANTS? 783
clarify [its] evolving law of sex stereotyping claims.”107 The court ana-
lyzed Jespersen’s Title VII discrimination claim under both the equal
burdens and sex stereotyping theories.
Under an equal burdens analysis, an employer’s grooming and ap-
pearance policy violates Title VII if it “unreasonably burden[s] one
gender more than the other.”108 The court found that Harrah’s ap-
pearance policy regulated both male and female bartenders, and even
though the individual requirements differed according to gender, none
were facially “more onerous for one gender than the other.”109 The
court also observed that Jespersen did not submit “any evidence of the
relative cost and time required to comply with the grooming require-
ments by men and women.”110 Thus, the court would have had to
“speculate” about the required cost and time to then “guess” whether
the policy unequally burdened women.111 Additionally, the court cited
to a string of pre-Price Waterhouse decisions to reaffirm that courts
had “long recognized that companies may differentiate between men
and women in appearance and grooming policies.”112
Moreover, the circuit court held that Jespersen’s objection to the
makeup requirement, without more, could not “give rise to a claim of
sex stereotyping under Title VII.”113 The court asserted that the case
essentially challenged “one small part”114 of an overall appearance
and grooming policy that applied to both male and female bartenders
and “require[d] all of the bartenders to wear exactly the same
uniforms.”115 The court emphasized that the makeup requirement
had to “be seen in the context of the overall standards imposed on
employees.”116
Thus, the court maintained that Jespersen’s claim “materially dif-
fer[ed] from Hopkins’ [sic] claim in Price Waterhouse because Harrah’s
grooming standards d[id] not require Jespersen to conform to a stere-
otypical image that would objectively impede her ability to perform
107. Id. at 1105.
108. Id. at 1110.
109. Id. at 1109.
110. Id. at 1110.
111. Id.
112. Id. (citing Fountain v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 555 F.2d 753, 755 (9th Cir. 1977);
Barker v. Taft Broad. Co., 549 F.2d 400, 401 (6th Cir. 1977); Earwood v. Cont’l Se.
Lines, Inc., 539 F.2d 1349, 1350 (4th Cir. 1976) (per curium); Knott v. Mo. Pac.
R.R. Co., 527 F.2d 1249, 1252 (8th Cir. 1975); Willingham v. Macon Tel. Publ’g
Co., 507 F.2d 1084, 1092 (5th Cir. 1975) (en banc); Baker v. Cal. Land Title Co.,
507 F.2d 895, 896 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1046 (1975); Dodge v.
Giant Food, Inc., 488 F.2d 1333, 1337 (D.C. Cir. 1973)).
113. Id. at 1112.
114. Id. at 1113.
115. Id. at 1111–12.
116. Id. at 1113.
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her job requirements as a bartender.”117 In fact, the court found no
evidence at all suggesting that “Harrah’s motivation was to stereotype
the women bartenders”118 or “that the policy was adopted to make wo-
men bartenders conform to a commonly-accepted stereotypical image
of what women should wear.”119 Finally, the court reasoned that if it
held that Jespersen’s objections to the makeup requirement alone
gave rise to a claim of sex stereotyping, then it “would come perilously
close to holding that every grooming, apparel, or appearance require-
ment that an individual finds personally offensive, or in conflict with
his or her own self-image, can create a triable issue of sex
discrimination.”120
On the other hand, the dissent “believe[d] that the ‘Personal Best’
program was part of a policy motivated by sex stereotyping and that
Jespersen’s termination for failing to comply with the program’s re-
quirements was ‘because of’ her sex.”121 It emphasized that Title VII
required that “gender must be irrelevant to employment decisions,”122
and that “Price Waterhouse recognizes that gender discrimination may
manifest itself in stereotypical notions as to how women should dress
and present themselves.”123 It reasoned that Harrah’s policy “treated
Jespersen differently from male bartenders ‘because of’ her sex,” and
“requir[ing] women to conform to a sex stereotype by wearing full
makeup is sufficient ‘direct evidence’ of discrimination.”124
Additionally, the dissent asserted: “The fact that a policy contains
sex-differentiated requirements that affect people of both genders can-
not excuse a particular requirement from scrutiny.”125 It criticized the
majority’s approach, insisting it “would permit otherwise impermissi-
ble gender stereotypes to be neutralized by the presence of a stereo-
type or burden that affects people of the opposite gender, or by some
separate non-discriminatory requirement that applies to both men
and women.”126 It also pointed to a gap in the majority’s reasoning
stating, “[T]he fact that employees of both genders are subjected to
gender-specific requirements does not necessarily mean that particu-
lar requirements are not motivated by gender stereotyping.”127
117. Id.
118. Id. at 1108.
119. Id. at 1112.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 1114 (Pregerson, J., dissenting).
122. Id. (quoting Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 240 (1989), superseded
by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071).
123. Id. at 1115 (citing Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 235).
124. Id.
125. Id. at 1116.
126. Id.
127. Id.
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Finally, in maintaining that Harrah’s “Personal Best” policy “was
adopted to make women bartenders conform to a commonly-accepted
stereotypical image of what women should wear,”128 the dissent con-
tended that:
Harrah’s regarded women as unable to achieve a neat, attractive, and profes-
sional appearance without the facial uniform designed by a consultant and
required by Harrah’s. The inescapable message is that women’s undoctored
faces compare unfavorably to men’s, not because of a physical difference be-
tween men’s and women’s faces, but because of a cultural assumption—and
gender-based stereotype—that women’s faces are incomplete, unattractive, or
unprofessional without full makeup. We need not denounce all makeup as in-
herently offensive . . . to conclude that requiring female bartenders to wear
full makeup is an impermissible sex stereotype and is evidence of discrimina-
tion because of sex.129
The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Jespersen sparked sharp criticism
from commentators who disagreed with the court’s holdings on both
the unequal burdens and sex stereotyping grounds.130 Despite this
high-profile decision, many remain optimistic that Price Waterhouse
could offer a path to eradicate the Title VII blind spot.131 This may be
particularly true in the Eighth Circuit, given that the court of appeals
has not considered a case involving an employer-mandated sex-differ-
entiated dress and grooming policy since 1985132 (prior to Price
128. Id. (“Disagree[ing] with the majority’s conclusion that there ‘is no evidence in this
record to indicate that the policy was adopted to make women bartenders con-
form to a commonly-accepted stereotypical image of what women should wear.’”).
129. Id.
130. See, e.g., Case, supra note 7, at 1358. Case observed that:
[I]nstead of “reaffirm[ing] [its] circuit law concerning appearance and
grooming standards,” the Ninth Circuit should have reevaluated its ap-
proach in light of [Price Waterhouse] and concluded that its own “evolv-
ing law of sex stereotyping claims,” previously focused on coworker
harassment of effeminate men . . . ,was even more clearly applicable to
an employer’s direct discriminatory treatment of a woman like
Jespersen.
Id. (quoting Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1105) (second and third alterations in origi-
nal) (footnote omitted). Similarly, Levi pointed out that:
What is so exceptional about the panel’s analysis is the suggestion that
the demonstration of different treatment of men and women is not,
alone, direct evidence of discrimination. Even though different treat-
ment alone proves sex discrimination in nearly every other situation, the
panel decided that, in the context of dress codes, different treatment is
not enough to prove a claim.
Levi, supra note 10, at 381.
131. See, e.g., Stephanie Bornstein, Unifying Antidiscrimination Law Through Stereo-
type Theory, 20 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 919, 924 (2016) (describing “sex discrimi-
nation lawsuits relying on the legal theory of stereotyping” as a “bright spot
offer[ing] a way forward” for antidiscrimination law); Levi, supra note 10, at 372
(“Enthusiasm for the [sex stereotyping] theory rests also on its analytical
strength and the possibility it portends for reversing the Title VII blind spot.”).
132. Craft v. Metromedia, Inc., 766 F.2d 1205, 1207 (8th Cir. 1985).
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Waterhouse) and the court’s general acceptance of the sex stereotyping
claim.133
IV. EIGHTH CIRCUIT PRECEDENT REGARDING EMPLOYER-
MANDATED SEX-DIFFERENTIATED DRESS AND
GROOMING CODES
The Eighth Circuit’s case law concerning employer-mandated sex-
differentiated dress and grooming codes is sparse. In the 1975 case
Knott v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Co., the Eighth Circuit joined
others in holding that a private employer’s grooming policy limiting
the hair length of male employees, but not female employees, did not
violate Title VII.134 When reviewing Title VII’s legislative history, the
court recognized that “the primary thrust of the provision was to dis-
card outmoded sex stereotypes posing distinct employment disadvan-
tages for one sex.”135 Nevertheless, the court found that the decisions
of other circuits represented the more “realistic and reasonable inter-
pretation” of Title VII and concluded that the Act “was never intended
to interfere in the promulgation and enforcement of personal appear-
ance regulations by private employers.”136 The court determined:
Without more extensive consideration [of the amendment adding sex to the
Act], Congress in all probability did not intend for its proscription of sexual
discrimination to have [such] significant and sweeping implications. We
should not therefore extend the coverage of the Act to situations of questiona-
ble application without some stronger Congressional mandate.137
The court noted the employer’s male hair length requirement was
“part of a comprehensive personal grooming code applicable to all em-
ployees.”138 It reasoned that when “such policies are reasonable and
are imposed in an evenhanded manner on all employees, slight differ-
ences in the appearance requirements for males and females have
only a negligible effect on employment opportunities.”139 Finally, the
court held that “minor differences in personal appearance regulations
that reflect customary modes of grooming do not constitute sex dis-
crimination within the meaning of [Title VII].”140
133. See, e.g., Lewis v. Heartland Inns of Am., L.L.C., 591 F.3d 1033, 1042 (8th Cir.
2010).
134. Knott v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 527 F.2d 1249, 1249 (8th Cir. 1975).
135. Id. at 1251.
136. Id. at 1251–52 (citing Willingham v. Macon Tel. Publ’g Co., 507 F.2d 1084 (5th
Cir. 1975) (en banc); Baker v. Cal. Land Title Co., 507 F.2d 895 (9th Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1046 (1975); Dodge v. Giant Food, Inc., 488 F.2d 1333 (D.C.
Cir. 1973); Fagan v. Nat’l Cash Register Co., 481 F.2d 1115 (D.C. Cir. 1973)).
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Following the decision in Knott, district courts in the Eighth Cir-
cuit upheld similar employer-mandated sex-differentiated dress and
grooming codes, including a workplace dress code requiring female of-
fice secretaries to wear skirts or dresses rather than pantsuits.141 The
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals did not revisit employer-mandated
sex-differentiated dress and grooming policies until 1985 in Craft v.
Metromedia, Inc.142
In that case, KMBC-TV in Kansas City, Missouri, had slipped in
its local news ratings and decided to adopt the co-anchor format used
by its competitors. “[B]ecause of the perceived ‘coldness’” of its male
anchor, KMBC decided to fill the position with a “female to ‘soften’ its
news presentation.”143 KMBC subsequently hired Christine Craft as
co-anchor. When Craft made her debut, both KMBC’s news director
and its vice president/general manager immediately had concerns
with her clothing and makeup. KMBC brought in a consultant to help
Craft with her wardrobe and other aspects of her “presentation
technique.”144
KMBC’s news director “continued to make occasional suggestions
or criticisms as to certain articles of Craft’s clothing, and Craft was
provided with materials, including the book Women’s Dress for Suc-
cess, on wardrobe and makeup.”145 KMBC arranged for a consultant
from Macy’s Department Store to assist Craft in selecting clothing.
Afterwards, Craft would return to the studio, try on the clothing for a
camera screen test, and send tapes to a consultant for review.146
After focus group discussions showed an “overwhelmingly nega-
tive” response to Craft’s appearance, KMBC increased supervision of
Craft’s wardrobe and instituted a “clothing calendar.”147 The clothing
calendar detailed the blazer, blouse, skirt or slacks, and jewelry that
Craft would wear each day.148 Following another customer survey
that again showed poor opinions of Craft’s appearance, KMBC “reas-
signed [Craft] to reporter at no loss of pay or contractual benefits.”149
Craft refused to accept reassignment, left KMBC, and brought a Title
VII sex discrimination claim against the company.150 The district
court ruled against Craft, finding that:
KMBC required both male and female on-air personnel to maintain profes-
sional, businesslike appearances “consistent with community standards” and
141. Lanigan v. Bartlett & Co. Grain, 466 F. Supp. 1388, 1390–91 (W.D. Mo. 1979).
142. 766 F.2d 1205, 1207 (8th Cir. 1985).
143. Id. at 1208.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 1208–09.
147. Id. at 1209.
148. Id. at 1209 n.2.
149. Id. at 1209.
150. Id.
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that the station enforced that requirement in an evenhanded, nondiscrimina-
tory manner. Any greater attention to Craft’s appearance . . . was “tailored to
fit her individual needs” and was necessary because of her “below-average ap-
titude” in matters of clothing and makeup.151
Craft sought reevaluation of the evidence and rejection of the district
court’s factual findings, but the court forewarned it could only set
them aside if they were clearly erroneous.152
Craft first argued that the district court erred in concluding the
facts, in light of all the evidence, “showed only that KMBC was con-
cerned with the appearance of all its on-air personnel and that it took
measures appropriate to individual situations, characteristics, and
shortcomings.”153 The court found that, like Craft, several males had
been given “specific directions as to their individual shortcomings,” in-
cluding directions on weight, fit, and color of clothing, and style of fa-
cial hair.154 The clothing calendar was only necessary for Craft
because less intrusive suggestions, like those complied with by other
employees, were ineffective.155
The court also noted that “[c]redibility . . . was central to the dis-
trict court’s finding[s].”156 One such finding was whether, as Craft tes-
tified, KMBC’s news director “told her she was being reassigned
because the audience perceived her as too old, too unattractive, and
not deferential enough to men.”157 KMBC’s news director denied mak-
ing such a statement and the district court believed him.158 Similarly,
the district court chose not to believe testimony alleging that KMBC’s
news director said it was more important for female anchors to look
good on air than it was for male anchors.159
Upon review, the court of appeals found that the district court’s
interpretation of the record had “support in inferences that may be
drawn from the facts.”160 Consequently, it determined the district
court’s conclusion that “KMBC enforced its appearance standards
equally as to males and females in response to individual problems
[was] neither ‘illogical’ nor ‘implausible.’”161 Thus, the court of ap-
peals could not conclude the district court had erred.162
Next, Craft argued that “even if KMBC was evenhanded in apply-
ing its appearance standards, the district court erred in failing to rec-
151. Id. at 1209–10 (citations omitted).
152. Id. at 1211.
153. Id. at 1213.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 1212.
157. Id. at 1209.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 1213–14.
160. Id. at 1213 (quoting Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 577 (1985)).
161. Id.
162. Id.
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ognize that the standards themselves were discriminatory” because
she was “forced to conform to a stereotypical image of how a woman
anchor should appear.”163 Relevant evidence included a communica-
tion from a consultant to KMBC’s news director criticizing Craft’s
clothes for being “too masculine” and suggesting Craft purchase more
blouses with “feminine touches, such as bows and ruffles.”164 KMBC’s
consultants’ general wardrobe hints for women also “warned that wo-
men with ‘soft’ hairstyles and looks should wear blazers to establish
their authority and credibility while women with short ‘masculine’
hairstyles shouldn’t wear ‘masculine’ clothing in dark colors and with
strong lines because they would appear too ‘aggressive.’”165 Further-
more, apparel guidelines for anchors suggested that men should re-
member “professional image” and women should remember
“professional elegance.”166
One of KMBC’s consultants testified that she had instructed Craft
not to wear the same outfit more than once every few weeks because
viewers would call KMBC about it; however, men could wear the same
suit twice in the same week as long as they wore a different tie.167 The
consultant testified that viewers criticized the appearance of women
more severely than men and that “women’s dress is more complex and
demanding because ‘society has made it that way.’”168 Craft argued
these differing standards reflected customer preferences, which some
cases held could not justify discriminatory practices.169
The district court disagreed and concluded that KMBC’s appear-
ance standards were based on permissible factors. Though there was
“some emphasis on the feminine stereotype[s] of ‘softness’ and bows
and ruffles,” and on female anchors’ “fashionableness,” it found that
“such concerns were incidental to a true focus on consistency of ap-
pearance, proper coordination of colors and textures, the effects of stu-
dio lighting on clothing and makeup, and the greater degree of
conservatism thought necessary in the Kansas City market.”170 Such
conservatism included the need for women to avoid “tight sweaters or
overly ‘sexy’ clothing and extreme ‘high fashion’ or ‘sporty’ outfits” and
163. Id. at 1214. Craft’s argument is similar to the one Hopkins would make a few






169. Id. at 1214–15 (citing Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385, 389
(5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971); Gerdom v. Cont’l Airlines, Inc.,
692 F.2d 602, 609 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. dismissed, 460 U.S. 1074 (1983); Fernan-
dez v. Wynn Oil Co., 653 F.2d 1273, 1276–77 (9th Cir. 1981)).
170. Id. at 1215.
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the need for men to avoid “ ‘frivolous’ colors and ‘extreme’ textures and
styles as damaging to the ‘authority’ of newscasters.”171
The court of appeals cited Knott and maintained that the afore-
mentioned criteria did not “implicate the primary thrust of Title VII,
which is to prompt employers to ‘discard outmoded sex stereotypes
posing distinct employment disadvantages for one sex.’”172 Addition-
ally, the court reasoned that employees’ appearance contributed to the
company’s public image and success; thus, “a reasonable dress or
grooming code [was] a proper management prerogative.”173 The court
determined that this was particularly true in television, citing the dis-
trict court’s finding that “reasonable appearance requirements were
‘obviously critical’ to KMBC’s economic well-being.”174
Though the court acknowledged KMBC’s overemphasis on appear-
ance, it claimed that it was “not the proper forum in which to debate
the relationship between newsgathering and dissemination and con-
siderations of appearance and presentation . . . in television journal-
ism.”175 Thus, the court of appeals found that the record did not leave
it with the “definite and firm conviction” that the district court
“adopted an impermissible view of the evidence when it concluded
that KMBC’s appearance standards were shaped only by neutral pro-
fessional and technical considerations and not by any stereotypical no-
tions of female roles and images.”176
The Eighth Circuit’s holding in Craft is markedly different than its
later holding in Lewis v. Heartland Inns of America, L.L.C.,177 which
was decided after the Supreme Court’s ruling in Price Waterhouse.
There, Brenna Lewis had successfully worked at Heartland Inns, the
operator of a group of hotels, for a year and a half.178 She had started
as the night auditor at one of the hotels, working the front desk from
11:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m.179 Lewis’s supervisors praised her for doing
her job well, making a good impression, and being well liked by cus-
tomers. She received several merit-based pay raises.180 Lewis’s man-
ager received permission over the phone from Heartland’s director of
operations to offer Lewis a full-time front desk position from 7:00 a.m.
to 3:00 p.m., and Lewis accepted the offer.181
171. Id.




176. Id. at 1215–16.
177. 591 F.3d 1033 (8th Cir. 2010).
178. Id. at 1035.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 1035–36.
181. Id. at 1036.
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However, after seeing Lewis, the director told Lewis’s manager
that she was unsure if Lewis was a “ ‘good fit’ for the front desk.”182
The director called Lewis’s manager later and again brought up
Lewis’s appearance.183 “Lewis describe[d] her own appearance as
‘slightly more masculine,’ and [Lewis’s manager] ha[d] characterized
it as ‘an Ellen DeGeneres kind of look.’”184 Though Lewis was not
challenging Heartland’s dress code, which required similar standards
of professional appearance for male and female employees, she “pre-
fer[red] to wear loose fitting clothing, including men’s button down
shirts and slacks. She avoid[ed] makeup and wore her hair short at
the time.”185
The director told Lewis’s manager that Heartland “took two steps
back” when Lewis replaced the previous front desk worker, who
dressed “in a more stereotypical feminine manner.”186 The director
claimed Lewis lacked the “Midwestern girl look,”187 which was impor-
tant because “Heartland staff should be ‘pretty,’ a quality she consid-
ered especially important for women working at the front desk.”188
However, Heartland’s personnel manual did not have an appearance
requirement.189
Shortly thereafter, Heartland instituted a policy requiring a sec-
ond interview over videoconference for the front desk position.190
Lewis met with the director for her second interview almost a month
after she had started working the new position and was aware of what
the director had said about her appearance.191 Lewis questioned the
director’s intention behind the interview.192 Lewis was fired three
days later and subsequently brought suit alleging Heartland “found
her unsuited for her job not because of her qualifications or her per-
formance on the job, but because her appearance did not comport with
its preferred feminine stereotype.”193
The Eighth Circuit agreed with Lewis and determined she had “of-
fered sufficient evidence from which a reasonable factfinder could find
that she was discriminated against because of her sex.”194 The court









190. Id. at 1036–37.
191. Id. at 1037.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 1038.
194. Id. at 1042.
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sex specific impositions on women in customer service jobs” (like
Lewis’s) illegal.195 Then, in Price Waterhouse, “the Supreme Court [ex-
plicitly] decided that sex stereotyping can violate Title VII when it in-
fluences employment decisions.”196 Thus, “an adverse employment
decision based on ‘gender nonconforming behavior and appearance’ is
impermissible.”197 It emphasized that “[a]fter Price Waterhouse, an
employer who discriminates against women because, for instance,
they do not wear dresses or makeup, is engaging in sex discrimination
because the discrimination would not occur but for the victim’s sex.”198
Consequently, the court determined that the applicable question
was whether the director’s “requirements that Lewis be ‘pretty’ and
have the ‘Midwestern girl look’ were because she [was] a woman.”199
It concluded that a reasonable factfinder could find these require-
ments to be evidence of wrongful sex stereotyping because “the terms
by their nature apply only to women.”200 The court reasoned that
“[c]ompanies may not base employment decisions for jobs such as
Lewis’ [sic] on sex stereotypes, just as Southwest Airlines could not
lawfully hire as flight attendants only young, attractive, ‘charming’
women ‘dressed in high boots and hot-pants[.]’ ”201 Quoting the Su-
preme Court’s Price Waterhouse decision, the Eighth Circuit con-
cluded that “we are beyond the day when an employer could evaluate
employees by assuming or insisting that they matched the stereotype
associated with their group.”202
V. USING PRICE WATERHOUSE SEX STEREOTYPING
THEORY TO REMEDY THE TITLE VII BLIND SPOT IN
THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
Since Heartland, there have been few challenges heard by the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals alleging the Price Waterhouse sex
stereotyping theory.203 However, plaintiffs have been allowed to state
195. Id. at 1038.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 1039 (quoting Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 571–72 (6th Cir.
2004)).
198. Id. at 1040 (alteration in original) (quoting Smith, 378 F.3d at 574). The court
emphasized this quotation both by italicizing a portion of the text and by stating
it twice in the opinion.
199. Id. at 1041.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 1042 (second alteration in original) (quoting Wilson v. Sw. Airlines Co., 517
F. Supp. 292, 294–95 (N.D. Tex. 1981)).
202. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228,
251 (1989), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166,
105 Stat. 1071).
203. As of January 2021, I have only been able to identify a single Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals opinion decided since Heartland that cites Price Waterhouse and
includes derivatives of the word “stereotype.” See Hunter v. United Parcel Serv.,
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a claim under the theory in district court.204 This successful applica-
tion of the Price Waterhouse sex stereotyping doctrine, together with
the fact that the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has not considered a
case involving an employer-mandated sex-differentiated dress and
grooming policy in more than thirty years,205 makes the Eighth Cir-
cuit a promising jurisdiction to apply the reasoning of Price
Waterhouse to remedy the Title VII blind spot.
The Eighth Circuit’s most relevant precedent on employer-man-
dated sex-differentiated dress and grooming codes includes Knott,
Craft, and Lewis. Given the similarities of the claims in these cases, it
is perhaps significant that the Lewis opinion (the most recent opinion)
mentions neither Knott nor Craft. Potentially even more insightful is
the fact that when the district court initially ruled against Lewis (a
ruling that was later reversed), it relied on Craft.206 Since the court of
appeals did not explicitly mention its reliance on Craft, this may sug-
gest that the court no longer perceived Craft to be relevant in the post-
Price Waterhouse jurisprudence of sex stereotyping.
This would not be surprising given the facts in Craft. Craft argued
that she was “forced to conform to a stereotypical image of how a wo-
man anchor should appear”207 and presented evidence that supported
her contention. KMBC hired Craft to “soften” its news presenta-
tion.208 When her wardrobe did not satisfy KMBC’s news director,
KMBC provided Craft with materials on apparel and makeup, includ-
ing the book Women’s Dress for Success.209 KMBC told Craft her
clothes were too masculine, instructed her to buy blouses with femi-
nine touches like bows and ruffles, and warned her that women with
short hairstyles should not wear masculine clothing because they
would look too aggressive.210 Even with these facts, in 1985, the
Eighth Circuit held that KMBC’s appearance standards were based on
permissible, nondiscriminatory factors.211
But, twenty-five years later, it is possible that the Eighth Circuit
compared these facts with the similar facts presented in Price
Waterhouse and determined that Craft did not apply to Lewis. Either
Inc., 697 F.3d 697, 704 (8th Cir. 2012) (holding that plaintiff could not prove em-
ployer discriminated against him because of a protected status because employer
was unaware of plaintiff’s protected status as gender-nonconforming).
204. See, e.g., Thompson v. CHI Health Good Samaritan Hosp., No. 8:16CV160, 2016
WL 5394691 (D. Neb. Sept. 27, 2016).
205. See Craft v. Metromedia, Inc., 766 F.2d 1205, 1207 (8th Cir. 1985).
206. Lewis v. Heartland Inns of Am., L.L.C., 585 F. Supp. 2d 1046, 1067 (S.D. Iowa
2008), rev’d, 591 F.3d 1033 (8th Cir. 2010).
207. Craft, 766 F.2d at 1214. Craft made this sex stereotyping argument prior to the
Supreme Court’s decision in Price Waterhouse.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 1208.
210. Id. at 1214.
211. Id. at 1215.
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way, thirty-five years after the court’s decision in Craft and forty-five
years after its decision in Knott, both cases now contain serious prece-
dential flaws.
Prior to Price Waterhouse, the Eighth Circuit upheld an employer-
mandated sex-differentiated dress and grooming code in Knott, rea-
soning that Congress likely did not intend for Title VII to have such
“significant and sweeping implications.”212 Thus, it concluded the
more “realistic and reasonable interpretation” of Title VII was that
Congress never intended the Act to interfere with the “promulgation
and enforcement” of employers’ personal appearance regulations.213
In a post-Price Waterhouse world, this reasoning would ignore both
the remarks of numerous representatives who advocated for the addi-
tion of “sex” to Title VII and the Supreme Court’s interpretation of
that intent.214 In Price Waterhouse, the Supreme Court recognized
that Congress’s enactment of Title VII conveyed to employers that sex
was irrelevant to the “selection, evaluation, or compensation of em-
ployees.”215 Consequently, if sex was to be irrelevant to employment
decisions,216 employers could no longer insist that their employees
matched the stereotype associated with their sex.217
The Eighth Circuit adopted this analysis in Lewis,218 emphasizing
that discrimination against women for not wearing dresses or makeup
was sex discrimination because it “would not occur but for the victim’s
sex.”219 This observation aligns with the interpretation of district
courts that struck down employer-mandated sex-differentiated dress
and grooming codes early after Title VII’s passage. In striking down
such policies, courts had reasoned that Congress adopted Title VII so
employees would be “judged by their intrinsic worth” rather than the
“stereotyped characterizations” that plagued America.220
Furthermore, in Knott, the Eighth Circuit reasoned that a dress
and grooming code with “minor differences” in requirements for men
and women that reflected “customary modes of grooming” was not sex
212. Knott v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 527 F.2d 1249, 1252 (8th Cir. 1975) (quoting Willing-
ham v. Macon Tel. Publ’g Co., 507 F.2d 1084, 1090 (5th Cir. 1975)).
213. Id. at 1251–52 (citing Willingham, 507 F.2d at 1084; Baker v. Cal. Land Title Co.,
507 F.2d 895 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1046 (1975); Dodge v. Giant
Food, Inc., 488 F.2d 1333 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Fagan v. Nat’l Cash Register Co., 481
F.2d 1115 (D.C. Cir. 1973)).
214. See supra note 18.
215. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 239 (1989), superseded by statute,
Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071.
216. Id. at 240.
217. Id. at 251.
218. Lewis v. Heartland Inns of Am., L.L.C., 591 F.3d 1033, 1042 (8th Cir. 2010).
219. Id. at 1040 (quoting Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 574 (6th Cir. 2004)).
220. Donohue v. Shoe Corp. of Am., 337 F. Supp. 1357, 1359 (C.D. Cal. 1972).
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discrimination under Title VII.221 In Craft, the court determined that
such “reasonable” codes were a “proper management prerogative.”222
However, forty-five and thirty-five years later, respectively, cul-
tural norms regarding customary modes of grooming and the reasona-
bleness of dress codes are not what they once were. Though women
could previously be jailed for wearing pants and were unofficially
banned from wearing them on the floor of the U.S. Senate,223 today
some states even have laws protecting women’s right to wear pants at
work.224 Women’s and men’s faces alike should be considered “per-
fectly presentable without makeup.”225 The Supreme Court and the
Eighth Circuit have recognized these changes by deeming it no longer
reasonable for an employer to make “a difference in treatment or
favor”226 of men and women or for an employer to insist employees
match the stereotype associated with their sex.227 However, if courts
like the Eighth Circuit agree that sex “must be irrelevant to employ-
ment decisions,”228 then they should hold that employers who impose
sex-differentiated dress and grooming codes discriminate on the basis
of sex because such codes allow employers to make decisions based on
an employee’s “gender nonconforming . . . appearance.”229 A declara-
tion by the Eighth Circuit that employer-mandated sex-differentiated
dress and grooming codes violate Title VII would be one large step
towards eliminating the Title VII blind spot and creating greater
equality for all workers, regardless of sex.
VI. CONCLUSION
The United States has come a long way in remedying employment
discrimination on the basis of sex. Courts have interpreted Title VII to
prohibit employers from enacting “facially sex-based practices and pol-
icies.”230 However, courts have continued to uphold employer-man-
dated dress and grooming codes that require men and women to
221. Knott v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 527 F.2d 1249, 1252 (8th Cir. 1975).
222. Craft v. Metromedia, Inc., 766 F.2d 1205, 1215 (8th Cir. 1985).
223. Marc Bain, A Brief History of Women’s Fight to Wear Pants, QUARTZ (May 8,
2019), http://qz.com/quartzy/1597688/a-brief-history-of-women-in-pants/ [https://
perma.unl.edu/XF6Q-SPCC].
224. See, e.g., CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12947.5 (West 2020).
225. Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104, 1118 (9th Cir. 2006) (Kozin-
ski, J., dissenting).
226. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 244 (1989) (quoting 110 CONG. REC.
7213 (1964)), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166,
105 Stat. 1071.
227. Id. at 251; Lewis v. Heartland Inns of Am., L.L.C., 591 F.3d 1033, 1042 (8th Cir.
2010).
228. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 240.
229. Lewis, 591 F.3d at 1039 (quoting Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 571–72
(6th Cir. 2004)).
230. Levi, supra note 10, at 355.
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comply with different standards.231 Ironically, it is easy to see that the
“Title VII blind spot” lives on.232
Though the Supreme Court declared in Price Waterhouse that “we
are beyond the day” when employers could require employees to
match the stereotype associated with their sex,233 in practice it has
been proven that we are still not beyond those days. Courts’ continued
support of employer-mandated sex-differentiated dress and grooming
codes forces employees to conform to expectations of gendered expres-
sion in the workplace.
Nevertheless, several factors make the Eighth Circuit a promising
jurisdiction to eliminate this Title VII blind spot. These include the
fact that the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has been generally re-
ceptive to plaintiffs bringing sex stereotyping claims234 and that it has
not considered a case directly related to employer-mandated sex-dif-
ferentiated dress and grooming codes since Price Waterhouse. Given
the changes in both cultural norms and the developing law surround-
ing sex stereotyping claims, we may soon see the end of the Title VII
blind spot.
231. See generally supra note 24.
232. Levi, supra note 10, at 356.
233. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 251.
234. See, e.g., Lewis, 591 F.3d at 1033.
